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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s and 1980s, the insurance industry
experienced high losses from “deep-pocket defendants” with
disproportionately high jury awards.1 These “deep-pocket
defendants” were often medical doctors and big businesses. The
industry responded to the losses by increasing premiums or
refusing to renew existing high-risk premiums. The industry
feared it would go under as a result of closing businesses and the
relocation of doctors to areas with lower premiums. In response
to this self-labeled “crisis,” laws were implemented which
restricted a plaintiff’s rights to a full recovery in hopes of
reducing insurance premiums; however, this result has not
always been achieved.2 The enactment of these laws began the
wave of what is most commonly referred to as “Tort Reform.”3
Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several
Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 647 (1988).
2 Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps In Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Finding A Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17
NEXUS: CHAP . J. L. & POL'Y 135, 140 (2012).
3 Michael P. Allen, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal “Tort
Reform,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 909 (2006).
1

54

6 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2019)

The threat of limitations on a plaintiff’s opportunity to
be fully compensated for injuries caused through no fault of their
own has been widespread over the years.4 For decades, both
state and federal governments have proposed and adopted laws
that limit the amount of money a plaintiff can recover. 5
Generally, the caps are placed on noneconomic and punitive
damages.
Noneconomic damages are those awarded to
compensate the plaintiff for damages such as pain and suffer ing
and loss of enjoyment. They are more speculative in nature due
to the uncertainty in how they can be calculated. Punitive
damages are those awarded to punish a defendant for
wrongdoing and deter others from acting in the same manner.
In regards to the caps on noneconomic and punitive
damages, states are split not only on what actual cap should be
applied but also to the constitutionality of such caps. 6 Section II
will discuss how Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama courts have
handled the caps and the challenges that have been made.
Section III will address how the states have attempted to
limit economic damages. Economic damages are damages
awarded to cover medical bills, lost wages, and other
calculatable damages and have not, up to this point, been
susceptible to caps. While no statutory caps have been placed on
economic damages, proponents for such limitations have
attempted to restrict economic damages in other ways. Some
states have limited or completely abrogated the Collateral
Source Rule, while others have attempted to expand narrowly
tailored state laws.7 The Collateral Source rule prevents
evidence of collateral payments from affecting a plaintiff’s right
to recover damages.8 Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama have all
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-39-101-104 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Second Reg. Session); GA . CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-5.1; 51-13-1 (West,
Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec. Session); ALA . CODE § 6-5-544
(2018).
6 Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damages Caps in Wrongful Death Medical
Malpractice Cases – Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA . ST. U. BUS. REV.
31, 51 (2015).
7 Danielle A. Daigle, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A Practical
Approach to Future Applications of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine,
53 ALA . L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2002).
8 2 STUART M. SPEISER, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:16 (Monique C.
M. Leahy et al. eds., 2018).
4
5
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taken different approaches to the collateral source rule, ranging
from strict adherence to complete abrogation.
II. CAPS ON DAMAGES AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES IN TENNESSEE, GEORGIA, AND ALABAMA
Legislative “caps” on damages are statutory limitations
on the amount of money a plaintiff may be awarded in a civil
suit. Most caps are placed on noneconomic and punitive
damages. The trend of implementing statutorily imposed caps
on noneconomic damages began with the California Legislature
in 1975 when it passed the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA).9 In response to the rapid state-wide
increase in insurance premiums resulting from large
malpractice jury awards, MICRA set a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic awards in medical malpractice claims.10 The
maximum amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff could
recover would be $250,000 regardless of the severity of the
negligence or injury. After California’s enactment of MICRA,
several states followed suit, and by 2005, over half of the states
had implemented legislation creating caps on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice claims.11
One argument in favor of the legislatively placed caps
refers to the rising insurance premiums due to large malpractice
jury awards.12 It is argued that high insurance premiums place
the state in a “malpractice crisis.” 13 Proponents for the caps
argue that lower jury awards and lower insurance payouts will
result in lower insurance premiums, which would provide
relief to the to the state from this “malpractice crisis.” 14 For this
theory to be correct, it must be assumed that the liability
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 1 & 2, 1975 Cal. Stat.
3949-4007.
10 Fish, supra note 2, at 137; CAL . CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Session).
11 Fish, supra note 2, at 137 (Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin).
12 Id. at 139.
13 Id.
14 Id.
9
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insurers would take it upon themselves to lower the premiums
due to their new protection by the cap. This assumption is farfetched. If there is any doubt as to whether the courts will
uphold the cap, the liability insurers will generally wait for the
constitutionality challenge to be resolved before taking any
action.15 This delay creates a very troubling scenario for
plaintiffs where their potential recovery has been limited and
the proposed purpose of lower insurance premiums has not
come to fruition.
Those against the implementation of caps argue that the
caps do not lower insurance premiums and point to California’s
continued increase in premiums despite the passing of
MICRA.16
In fact, the California insurance premiums
continued to rise until 1988, and only upon the passing of
broader insurance reform legislation did those premiums start
to decrease.17
Additionally, those opposed to caps often point out the
fact that Minnesota has the lowest insurance premiums
“despite the fact that the state has no statutory noneconomic
damage cap or medical malpractice insurance crisis.” 18 This
casts doubt on the argument that the limitations are a large
factor in reduced insurance premiums. Acknowledging that
other factors besides a lack of damage caps in Minnesota likely
need to be considered, the fact that no cap exists is a persuasive
indication that caps are not required, as argued by some, to
lower premium rates.19
Opponents most often argue that the caps violate a
constitutional right, more specifically, a citizen’s right to a jury
trial.20 The Seventh Amendment creates the right to a jury trial
in civil suits, specifically stating that “no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States.” 21 The theory is that the limit placed on the award
undercuts the jury’s ability to make the determination by
Id.
Id. at 140.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 138.
20 J. Chase Bryan, et al., Are Non-Economic Caps Constitutional?, 80
DEF. COUNS. J. 154, 154 (2013).
21 U.S. CONST . amend. VII.
15
16
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reducing the award, essentially abrogating the advantage of
having a neutral body determine damages.22
The limits on the caps and the basis and results of the
constitutional challenges differ from state to state.23 As of 2013,
twenty-nine states had adopted some form of statutory caps on
non-economic damages.24 Of those twenty-nine states, the
constitutionality of those caps has been upheld in seventeen
states.25 The below subsections discuss the statutory caps put
in place, the constitutional challenges to the caps, and how the
courts have handled those challenges within the Southern states
of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama.

A. TENNESSEE CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
CHALLENGES
Prior to October 1, 2011, a Tennessee plaintiff could
recover for an endless amount of both economic and
noneconomic damages without being subject to caps on that
award.26 Much changed when the Tennessee Legislature
enacted the Tennessee Civil Justice Act in 2011. While economic
damages remain recoverable without limitation, statutory caps
have been imposed on noneconomic damages in all civil
actions, including health care liability claims.27 The Legislature
justified the limits as necessary for Tennessee’s economic
development.28 The caps limited recovery of noneconomic
damages to seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars
($750,000) in non-catastrophic situations and one million

Fish, supra note 2, at 145.
Ganske, supra note 6, at 51.
24 Bryan, et al., supra note 20, at 157.
25 Id.
26 John W. Elder & Joshua R. Walker, The Tennessee Civil Justice Act of
2011, 47 TENN. B.J. 20, 22 (2011).
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Second Reg. Session); Healthcare Liability Actions Under the
Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12 -58
(2012).
28 Clark v. Cain, No. 12C1147, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
March 9, 2015).
22
23
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dollars ($1,000,000) in catastrophic situations.29
Many personal injury cases never reach high enough
values to be subjected to the caps. However, when a
defendant’s actions and the resulting injuries are severe enough
to warrant such high awards, it begs the question of whether a
plaintiff can be fully “made whole” when the amount of
damages available is automatically reduced.30
Tennessee’s 2011 wave of tort reform also created caps
on punitive damage awards. In order to prevail on a punitive
damage award, the court must first, in a bifurcated trial,
determine whether to make an award of compensatory
damages and determine whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant “acted maliciously, intentionally,
fraudulently, or recklessly.” 31 It is also determined whether the
defendant’s conduct fits one of the statutory exceptions to the
caps on punitive damages.32 If compensatory damages are
awarded and the defendant was found to have acted with
malice, the court will promptly hold an evidentiary hearing and
have the jury determine the amount of punitive damages, if
any.33 Unless one of the statutory exceptions apply, the amount
actually awarded to the plaintiff cannot exceed five hundred
thousand dollars ($500,000) or two (2) times the total amount of
compensatory damages awarded.34
It cannot be argued that caps on punitive damages
prevent a plaintiff from being made whole due to the nature of

§ 29-39-102(a)(2) and (c) (Westlaw) (catastrophic is statutorily
defined as “(1) spinal cord injury resulting in paraplegia or
quadriplegia; (2) amputation of two (2) hands, two (2) feed, or one
(1) of each; (3) third degree burns [covering 40% or more of the body
or face]; or (4) wrongful death of a parent leaving a [minor surviving
child(ren) to whom the parent had lawful rights over]”).
30 Fish, supra note 2, at 138.
31 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018
Second Reg. Session).
32 § 29-39-104(a)(7) (Westlaw) (those exceptions include specific
intent to inflict serious physical injury; the altering, destroying or
concealing of records in an attempt to evade liability; and if the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or an intoxicant
when the injury was caused).
33 § 29-39-104 (Westlaw).
34 § 29-39-104(a)(5) (Westlaw).
29
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deterrence that embodies punitive damages.35 Simply put,
punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory
damages in order to punish the defendant for egregious and
intentional behavior to the extent that the defendant and others
would learn by example and refrain from acting in such ways
in the future. These may be awarded only after it has been
decided that the plaintiff can be “made whole” with an award
of compensatory damages.36 Lacking the “made whole”
defense, proponents against caps on punitive damages needed
another way to challenge the validity of the statute.
A stronger alternative argument against caps on
damages is one that attacks the constitutionality of the specific
statutes. In Tennessee, a few cases have attempted to challenge
the Tennessee Civil Justice Act on the grounds that it violates a
citizen’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.37
Challengers argue that the automatic reduction in
awards divests a jury of its power “to decide facts and
determine damages thereby denying plaintiff [the]right to a
jury trial.” 38 This point was argued in Clark v. Cain, a case
involving a motor vehicle accident wherein the plaintiff alleged
$22,500,000 in pain and suffering damages.39 The plaintiff also
alleged that any legislative limitation prohibiting the recovery
of such an amount was unconstitutional.40 When the
defendants moved for partial summary judgment seeking to
cap the award at the statutory amount, they responded to the
constitutionality challenge by arguing that the issue was not yet
ripe for decision.41 The defendants urged that the “plaintiffs
had not yet been, nor might never be, awarded noneconomic
damages that were in excess of the cap,” thus the cap might not

Andrea Moore Hawkins, Balancing Act: Public Policy and Punitive
Damages Caps, 49 S.C. L. REV. 293, 296 (1998).
36 § 29-39-104(a)(2) (Westlaw).
37 Clark v. Cain, No. 12C1147, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
March 9, 2015); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 147 F.
Supp. 3d 694 (W.D. Tenn. 2015).
38 Bryan, et al., supra note 20, at 155.
39 Clark, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1.
40 Id. at *3 (plaintiff alleged the statutory caps violated a citizen’s
right to a trial by jury).
41 Clark v. Cain, 479 S.W.3d 830, 831 (Tenn. 2015).
35
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be applicable.42 Essentially, the defendants were arguing that a
plaintiff cannot claim a statute is unconstitutional when it has
not yet been determined by a court that the statute would apply
to the situation at hand.
The court denied the defendants’ motion and disagreed
as to the issue of ripeness.43 In making this determination, the
court went through an extensive analysis of construing
constitutional issues and determined that the right to a jury trial
is a fundamental right; therefore, strict scrutiny applied.44 In
applying the strict scrutiny test, the court found that the State
failed to show that the economic development of the State was
more important than a citizen’s right to a jury trial.45 In fact,
after reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the court
found nothing to support the fact that caps on non-economic
damages were beneficial for economic development in
Tennessee.46 The opinion centered around the rationale that if
the caps fail to further the purpose for which they were
implemented, then they should be struck down.
When the court ruled that the right to a jury trial had
been violated, it quoted Chief Justice Marshall in the Marbury
v. Madison opinion where he stated that “[t]he very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury.” 47 In applying that protection of the laws to the case at
hand, the court concluded that damages were an essential part
of a tort action, and as such, any attempt to alter an award that
had been determined by a jury would be contradictory to the
right to trial by jury.48
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in Clark, the defendants
filed an appeal alleging that the trial court erred in holding the
statute unconstitutional. 49 Both parties agreed that the
Tennessee Supreme Court should resolve the constitutionality
42

Id.

43 Clark,

2015 WL 1137546, at *4.
Id.
45 Id. at *7.
46 Id. at *8.
47 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
48 Clark, 2015 WL 1137546, at *6.
49 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Second Reg. Session).
44
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issue surrounding the caps on noneconomic damages;
however, the Court disagreed.50 The Court declined to decide
the constitutionality of the statute, holding that the issue was
not ripe to be decided at the summary judgment stage.51 The
Court explained that the role of Tennessee courts is to decide
issues that actually exist at the time they are being disputed,
and because an award of damages in excess of the cap had not
yet been awarded, it was unknown as to whether the cap would
even apply.52 The opinion went on to say that because it is still
an open issue as to whether the cap will even apply, the trial
court “acted prematurely in considering . . . [the] constitutional
challenge at this [early] stage of the proceedings.” 53
Shortly after the Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the noneconomic caps, a diversity case
coming from the Western District of Tennessee, Lindenberg v.
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., presented a similar situation.54 This
case involved a dispute over a life insurance policy payout
involving alleged bad faith on the part of the defendant
insurance company. After the court ruled that the insurance
company owed the plaintiff $350,000 plus interest in actual
damages, a jury found clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted recklessly and awarded punitive damages in
the amount of $3,000,000. 55
The defendant had filed a Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law as to the award of punitive damages.56 The
defendant argued that the Tennessee punitive damages cap
applied and that the plaintiff was only entitled to the statutory
maximum of $500,000.57 The plaintiff responded and alleged
that the cap was unconstitutional, but argued that if the statute

Clark v. Cain, 479 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Tenn. 2015).
Id.
52 Id. at 831 (quoting West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 490 (Tenn.
2015)).
53 Clark, 479 S.W.3d at 832.
54 Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 3d 694
(W.D.Tenn. 2015)
55 Id. at 699.
56 Id.
57 Lindenberg, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 704; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104
(West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. Session).
50
51
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was constitutional, they would be entitled to $700,000.58 The
plaintiff filed a Motion for Certification of Questions to the
Tennessee Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the
statutory caps on punitive damages. After denying the
defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and
granting the plaintiff’s Motion for a Certified Question, the trial
court decided not to rule on the amount of punitive damages to
be awarded until hearing back from the Tennessee Supreme
Court.
Again, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to
answer the certified question as to whether the caps on punitive
damages were violative of a citizen’s right to a jury trial.59 The
Court stated that the real issue at hand was whether a plaintiff
could be awarded a “common law remedy of punitive damages
in addition to the statutory remedy of the bad faith penalty,”
and because such issue had not been certified by the trial court
and had not yet been decided, “it would be imprudent for [the
Court] to answer the certified questions concerning the
constitutionality of the statutory caps on punitive damages in
this case in which the question of the availability of those
damages in the first instance has not been and cannot be
answered by this Court.” 60
Once the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to answer
the certified question, the trial court took it upon itself to answer
the issue presented by the Court regarding the availability of
both statutory bad faith damages and punitive damages.61
Citing Riad v. Erie Ins. Exchange, the court noted that a
plaintiff’s damages were not limited to the statutory bad faith
damages and, acting on precedent, ruled that both remedies
were available for the plaintiff. 62
In analyzing the constitutionality of the punitive
damage caps, the court found that the right to a jury trial does
not include the right to a specific legal remedy.63 The court
Id.
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Riad v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 436 S.W.3d 256, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2013).
63 Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 711, 719
(W.D. Tenn. 2016); See also Dowlen v. Fitch, 264 S.W.2d 824, 825
58
59
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essentially was telling the plaintiff that because the right to
punitive damages is not a vested right in a citizen, that it cannot
be said that capping the availability of punitive damages can be
in violation of a constitutional right.
The court found that the caps were constitutional and as
such, awarded the plaintiff punitive damages in the amount of
$700,000, which is reflective of the statutory maximum allowed
within the statute.64
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s lack of decision on the
issue along with the lack of existing case law on the subject only
furthers the ambiguity as to the constitutionality of the caps on
damages. A lack of a decision on the matter essentially equates
to a decision upholding the constitutionality, as the caps are still
in place. However, this lack of decision also indicates that the
Court has left the door open for future challenges.

B. GEORGIA CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY CHALLENGES
Similar to the Tennessee Civil Justice Act, Georgia
implemented the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 1987 and later
amended it in 2005. The Act placed a cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases at $350,000.65 The Act
was put in place to help with what the Legislature called a crisis
involving reduced access to and increasing cost of liability
insurance which resulted in the potential for decreased access
to healthcare by Georgia citizens.66
In 2010, the cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases was challenged.67 In Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery P.C. v. Nestlehutt, the jury awarded the plaintiff
$900,000 in noneconomic damages after having permanent
disfigurement resulting from a procedure performed by the

(Tenn. 1954) (holding that the cases ruling a person has no vested
right in a particular remedy are abundant).
64 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(5)(A) (West, Westlaw through
2018 Second Reg. Session).
65 GA . CODE . ANN. § 51-13-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and
Spec. Sessions).
66 2005 Ga. Laws p. 1.
67 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218
(Ga. 2010).
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defendant medical provider.68 The plaintiff moved to have the
cap deemed unconstitutional. 69 The trial court held that the
statute violated Georgia’s Constitution by encroaching on the
right to a jury trial.70 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed on
the basis that at the time of the adoption of the Georgia
Constitution of 1798, medical malpractice and the right to a trial
by jury were incorporated into the Georgia Constitution.71 The
Court concluded that the right to have a jury determine a
plaintiff’s damages is included as a constitutional right, and
held that the statute infringed on the right to have the jury
determine damages by undermining the very basic function of
the jury.72 “If the legislature may constitutionally cap recovery
at $350,000, there is no discernible reason why it could not cap
the recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or
$1.” 73 The Georgia Supreme Court ruled the statute
unconstitutional with the release of the Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery opinion which remains good law to date.74
The Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery opinion distinguished
caps on noneconomic damages from caps on punitive
damages.75 Punitive damages cannot violate the right to trial by
jury because they are “not really facts tried by the jury.” 76
Because punitive damages are so deterring and punishing in
nature and not used to compensate the plaintiff, a cap cannot
be said to be a violation of the Seventh Amendment.77
While not violative of the Seventh Amendment, caps on
Id. at 220.
§ 51-13-1 (Westlaw 2018).
70 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery P.C., 691 S.E.2d at 220 (The trial court
also ruled that statute encroached upon the governmental separation
of powers and the right to equal protection. The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed based on their finding of an encroachment upon the
right to trial by jury).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 222-23 (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures TV, Inc., 523
U.S. 340, 353 (1998).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 GA . CODE . ANN. § 51-12-5.1(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
and Spec. Sessions); See also State v. Mosley, 436 S.E. 2d 632 (Ga.
1993).
68
69
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punitive damages have been deemed constitutionally invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause when it comes to products
liability claims.78 Specifically, the district court in McBride
ruled that OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(1), which limits a plaintiff to a
single punitive recovery regardless of the number of causes of
actions, was “null and void in that it violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Georgia and federal
constitutions.” 79 The court reasoned that the single award
“unconstitutionally discriminate[d] between plaintiffs in
products liability actions because it would deny any awards to
all but the first plaintiff whose claim arose out a particular act
or omission.” 80 Additionally, it would also discriminate
between plaintiffs in products liability cases versus plaintiffs in
non-products liability cases who are not limited to the single
award.81 The court also ruled that section (e)(2) was also
constitutionally invalid under the Takings Clause, as it
mandated for 75% of the total recovery in products liability
cases to be given to the State.82
Interestingly, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to
follow McBride when it upheld OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) as
completely constitutional. 83 The Court in Mack Trusts, Inc. v.
Conkle upheld the constitutionality of OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(1)
and (e)(2) holding that “[a] plaintiff has no vested property
right in the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded
in any case, and the legislature may lawfully regulate the
amount of punitive damages which can be awarded.” 84
This opinion begs the question of how far the legislature
can go when it comes to caps on punitive damages. It has been
established that there is no constitutional right to an award of
punitive damages, which is what allows case law decisions like
Mack Trucks and legislatively regulated limitations on

McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
Id. at 1579.
80 2 BARRY A. LINDAHL , MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 21:14 (2d ed. 2017).
81 Id.
82 McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579.
83 ERIC JAMES HERTZ, MARK D. LINK, GEORGIA PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 212 (2d. ed. 2017).
84 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993).
78
79
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damages.85 With the free range the Georgia Court has given to
the legislature, it begs the question of whether eventually, this
could lead to the complete abrogation of punitive damages.

C. ALABAMA CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY CHALLENGES
Like Tennessee and Georgia, Alabama has adopted a
series of tort reform legislation, including a cap of $400,000 on
noneconomic damages in health care liability cases.86
In 1991, the $400,000 cap was challenged as being
violative of a citizen’s right to a jury trial.87 The plaintiff was
awarded $600,000 in noneconomic damages arising from a
medical malpractice claim.88 The trial court, pursuant to the
statutory cap, reduced the award to the maximum amount
allowed of $400,000. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of the cap.89
When the Alabama Supreme Court ruled the cap
unconstitutional, it reiterated the Court’s prior rulings, which
cautioned against altering a jury’s award of damages unless the
determination was influenced by “bias, passion, prejudice,
corruption, or other improper motive.” 90 The Court was
influenced by the notion that noneconomic damages are
difficult to calculate, and acknowledged that “[t]he jury's role
in fixing the amount of damages has been regarded as
particularly sacrosanct in cases involving damages not
susceptible of precise measurement.” 91 Because there was no
evidence that the jury’s assessment of damages was flawed by
bias, prejudice, corruption, or fraud, the Court ruled that a
jury’s determination of damages is protected by the right to a
jury trial, and thus, any statute preventing that jury’s award
Id.
Leonard J. Nelson, III, et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three
Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED . L. 69, 114 (2008).
87 Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991).
88 Id. at 157.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 161.
91 Id. at 160-61; See also Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley, 318 So.2d 260,
266 (Ala. 1975); Austin v. Tennessee Biscuit Co., 52 So.2d 190 (Ala.
1951); Montgomery Light & Traction Co. v. King, 65 So. 998 (Ala.
1914); Sheffield Co. v. Harris, 61 So. 88 (Ala. 1912).
85
86

LIMITING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES

67

from being given as is offends the Alabama Constitution. 92
The above discussion regarding the placement of and
the constitutional challenges to caps on damages only discusses
caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, because the
majority of the caps are not applicable to economic damages.
One way insurance companies and insurance defense attorneys
are attempting to get around the lack of caps on economic
damages is by attempting to limit the collateral source rule. The
next section discusses what the collateral source rule is and how
the insurance industry is attempting to limit the rule both in its
application of calculating damages as well as from an
evidentiary standpoint.

III. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
When injured in tort, a plaintiff may receive
collateral payments from third parties, such as insurance
companies, who have no connection with the defendant.93
This often occurs through health insurance companies
when they pay for medical services, or auto insurance
companies when they pay you for your property damage.
Pursuant to the rule, evidence that the plaintiff has
received benefits from third parties who have no relation
to the defendant will not be used to reduce the total
recovery received by the plaintiff.94 Rules like this have
been implemented in every state within the United
States.95
The collateral source rule is a multipurpose rule
that is applicable to both damages and the rules of
evidence.96 Not only does it prohibit reduced recovery by
payments from collateral sources, but it also prohibits the
introduction of evidence of such payments by barring the
Moore, 592 So.2d. at 164.
2 STUART M. SPEISER, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:16 (Monique C.
M. Leahy et al. eds., 2018).
94 Id.
95 Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source
Rule: Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J.
210, 210 (2009).
96 Id.
92
93
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introduction of evidence of collateral source payments
made towards any part of a plaintiff’s damages.97
One argument used to justify the use of the rule is
that the payments are often gratuitous in nature or stem
from a pre-existing contractual relationship, and a plaintiff
should not be penalized for such good fortune.98
Proponents for the limitation of the rule often argue that
allowing recovery of collateral source payments allows
the plaintiff to “double recover.” 99 Some states have
enacted statutes specifically for the purpose of preventing
double recovery.100 Other states acknowledge the that
double recovery may be a windfall for the plaintiff;
however, a defendant who escapes liability, wholly or
partially, also enjoys a windfall.101 Because the law must
sanction one windfall and deny the other, these states opt
to favor the victim of the wrong as opposed to the
wrongdoer.102 Others have recognized the double
recovery as acceptable, so long as the payments are
coming from someone who is wholly unconnected to the
defendant.103 The following subsections discuss how
Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama differ in their
application of the collateral source rule.
A. TENNESSEE COLLATERAL SOURCE
In Tennessee, the collateral source rule was first
recognized in 1896, when the Tennessee Supreme Court heard
a case regarding damages caused by a fire that started in one
business and spread to the adjacent business belonging to the

Michael Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral Source
Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 39, 42 (1990).
98 Benjet, supra note 95, at 210.
99 Id. at 213.
100 See IDAHO CODE ANN § 6-1606 (West, Westlaw through 2018
Second Reg. Session).
101 Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 38 (Del. 2005).
102 Id.
103 See Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. OneOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 440-41
(Kan. 2006).
97
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plaintiff. 104 In the landmark case, Anderson v. Miller, the
plaintiff, being fully insured, received insurance money to
repair the business.105 The defendants argued that the
insurance benefits received by the plaintiff diminished the
damages claim against them.106 They reasoned that the
insurance money put the plaintiffs back to the place they had
been prior to the fire, and thus there was no reason to recover
from the defendants as well.107 The Court disagreed and held
that the insurance benefits obtained by the plaintiff did not
affect the defendant’s responsibilities to the plaintiff, and such
responsibilities would not be taken away or minimized by the
fact that the plaintiff received the insurance benefits.108 This
was the beginning of the utilization of the collateral source rule
in Tennessee.
After Anderson, Tennessee formally adopted the
Restatement’s version of the collateral source rule which, in part,
states “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured
party from other sources are not credited against the
tortfeasor’s liability.” 109 Tennessee has continuously upheld the
rule even though there has been opposition to its application.110
The Court’s decision in a 1998 case upholding the rule
emphasized Tennessee’s requirement that damages must be a
reasonable value of necessary services.111 For a plaintiff to
recover for services rendered, they must show that the rendered
services were necessary for the treatment of the injury and the
Anderson v. Miller, 33 S.W. 615, 616 (Tenn. 1896).
Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (AM. LAW INST . 1979).
110 See Hall v. USF Holland, 152 F. Supp 3d 1037 (W.D. Tenn. 2016);
Dedmon v. Steelman, 535 S.W.3d 431 (Tenn. 2017); West v. Shelby
County Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014); Fry v.
Kennedy, 991 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1998); J&M, Inc. v. Cupples, No.
E2004-01328-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1190704, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005) (noting the long adaptation of the collateral source rule in
Tennessee); Simpson v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 172 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding a $10,000 contractual liability payment by US
Government could not be used to reduce the amount of damages
awarded to the Plaintiff).
111 Fry, 991 S.W.2d at 764.
104
105
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charges for those services were reasonable.112 Once proved
reasonable and necessary, the defendant is prohibited from
attempting to prove that the service rendered has been paid or
will be paid by collateral sources.113

1. WEST AND ITS AFTERMATH
The problem of what is reasonable and necessary arises
in situations where the medical providers are paid less than
what the services were billed for.114 This occurs generally due
to contractual agreements between health insurance companies
and medical providers where the providers will accept a
discounted rate, and in return, the insurance companies have
the provider listed as an approved provider under an insured’s
policy.115 When a service is billed for one amount but is
considered paid in full after receiving a lower amount than
what was billed, an issue arises as to what is the reasonable
charge for the services rendered.116
In 2014, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a case
which centered around the applicability of the reasonable and
necessary requirement when acting pursuant to the Hospital
Lien Act.117 The Hospital Lien Act in part states that when a
person is injured and pursues a claim for damages resulting
from those injuries, the law requires that the hospital file a lien
against the claim for all reasonable and necessary charges for
hospital care and treatment. 118
The plaintiff in West was billed $14,000.00 for hospital
and a lien was perfected on the personal injury lawsuit in that
amount.119 The hospital, pursuant to the contractual agreement,
only billed the plaintiff’s health insurance company for
$3,000.00 which was paid in full.120 The hospital refused to
Id.
Id.
114 Id.
115 West, 459 S.W.3d at 37.
116 Id.
117 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-22-101 to 107 (West, Westlaw through
2018 Second Reg. Session).
118 § 29-22-101(a) (Westlaw).
119 West, 459 S.W.3d at 38.
120 Id.
112
113
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extinguish the lien, reasoning they were waiting to see whether
they could recover the non-discounted price from the
defendants in the case.121 When the plaintiff sued to have the
lien extinguished, the Court had to determine which amount
was reasonable; the amount billed to the plaintiff or the amount
billed to the insurance company.122
The Court determined that, under the statute,
“reasonable” was the amount of charges agreed upon by the
insurance company and the hospital, and not the nondiscounted amount for which the patient would have been
originally billed.123 The plaintiff’s lien was extinguished due to
payment in full of the reasonable and necessary charges by her
insurance company.124 The Court specified that this definition
of “reasonable” was limited in application to the Hospital Lien
Act.125
After West was decided, defense attorneys across the
state began arguing for an extension of the West decision to the
definition of “reasonable” in all personal injury cases.126 The
defendants argued that the plaintiff’s recoverable damages
should be limited to the benefits actually paid by the insurer.127
In stark contrast, the plaintiffs sought to recover the full amount
of their damages, arguing that any reduction in recovery
resulting from insurance benefits received would be violative
of the collateral source rule.128

2. TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
In its decision in Dedmon v. Steelman, the Tennessee
Supreme Court clarified that the “holding in West was not
intended to apply in personal injury cases.” 129 The defendant
wished to limit the plaintiff’s introduction of, and possible
Id.
Id. at 44.
123 Id. at 46.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 44.
126 DEDMOND V. STEELMAN, 535 S.W.3 D 431, 446 (TENN. 2017).
127 Hall v. USF Holland, 152 F. Supp 3d 1037, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 2016).
128 Id.
129 Dedmond, 535 S.W.3d at 450 (emphasis added).
121
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recovery of, medical bills to the discounted price paid by the
plaintiff’s health insurance company, arguing that the decision
in West should be extended.130 In ruling that West did not
extend to personal injury cases, the Court outlined the longstanding existence and enforcement of the collateral source rule
in Tennessee and emphasized the strong public policy rooted in
maintaining a defendant’s responsibility for any harm caused
despite the plaintiff’s receiving collateral benefits.131
Even though Tennessee upheld the existence of the
collateral source rule in personal injury cases, the rule has been
abrogated in regard to medical malpractice claims where the
costs for the collateral benefits have been or will be paid by
sources other the plaintiff, in whole or in part.132 The Court has
noted that because this collateral source exception is in direct
conflict with the rule that has long been upheld in Tennessee,
“it must be strictly construed.” 133 The Court applied this strict
construction of the statute in a case where a plaintiff had
contributed to an insurance plan through his employer and
those contributions had been used partially to cover the
plaintiff’s insurance plan through the employer.134 It was held
that the medical malpractice exception did not apply here
because the plaintiff partially contributed to the costs of the
reasonable and necessary medical services by contributing to
the insurance plan.135
Absent the medical malpractice exception to the
collateral source rule, Tennessee has not altered its version of
the rule and, similar to Georgia, continues to uphold the

Id. at 435.
Id. at 451.
132 The collateral source rule has been abrogated in regard to medical
malpractices claims where the collateral benefits will have been paid
for by governmental or private employers, social security benefits,
service benefit programs, unemployment benefits, or any other
source except the asses of the claimants. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26119 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. Session).
133 Hunter v. Ura, 163 S.W.3d 686, 711 (Tenn. 2005).
134 Id.
135 Id.
130
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collateral payment protections.

B. GEORGIA COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
While Tennessee strays slightly from the full application
of the collateral source rule, Georgia strictly adheres to it;
however, this has not always been the case. During an early
movement of tort reform, a law was passed by the Georgia
legislature which allowed the admission of evidence of
collateral sources at trial.136 This was eventually challenged and
deemed unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court.137 The
Court invalidated the statute, noting that collateral source
evidence is not only irrelevant but has a strong likelihood of
being prejudicial.138
With the statute allowing evidence of collateral sources
no longer in play, Georgia retracted back to its days of strict
adherence and continued to uphold the application of the rule
in tort cases; however, the court refused to apply it in contract
cases.139 Additionally, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that
a plaintiff may not recover for medical bills that had previously
been discharged through bankruptcy. 140 The court reasoned
that discharge through bankruptcy is not a “collateral source”
at all, as “[t]here is no third party acting as an additional source
of recovery.” 141 It was also mentioned that if allowed, it might
encourage bankruptcy, which would be against public
policy.142 With the minor exception for bankruptcy, Georgia
still follows the common law rule that no collateral source
evidence will be admissible at trial in an attempt to reduce the
GA . CODE. ANN. § 51–12–1(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
and Spec. Sessions).
137 Denton v. Con-Way Southern Exp., 402 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991).
138 Id. at 273.
139 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 434 S.E.2d 450,
452, (Ga. 1993) (holding that the collateral source rule does not apply
in contract cases because collateral source evidence can be admitted
if it is relevant to demonstrate the extent of the plaintiff's actual loss
that was caused by the breach); See also Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d
121 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); McDonald v. Simmons, 428 S.E.2d 690 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993).
140 Olariu, 549 S.E.2d 121.
141 Id. at 124.
142 Id. at 125.
136
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plaintiff’s recoverable damages.

C. ALABAMA COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
In stark contrast to both Tennessee and Georgia,
Alabama has completely gotten rid of the collateral source rule
in all civil actions which seek damages.143 This abrogation
means the defendant can present the discounted bills as a
defense to the plaintiff’s medical bills being reasonable and
necessary, which would allow for a reduced recovery.
Before abolishing the law in 1979, Alabama followed an
articulated rule that had been set out by the Alabama Supreme
Court since 1910, which in part stated “[t]he mere fact that the
insurer has paid the insured cannot affect the action against the
wrongdoer who has destroyed or injured the property, the
subject of the insurance.” 144 The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld this rule in Carlisle v. Miller, where the Court held that
any recovery by a plaintiff from an insurer shall not “affect his
measure of recovery, and such evidence is not admissible in the
trial of such cause.” 145
The first piece of legislation abrogating the rule in
Alabama applied to products liability cases.146 The law
provided that evidence of the plaintiff’s medical expenses that
may have been or might have been paid by health insurance
would be admissible in trial for the purpose of mitigating any
medical expense damages.147
Another wave of tort reform came through Alabama in
the late 1980s, and newly enacted statutes abrogated the
collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases and in all
personal injury cases seeking damages for medical expenses.148
The constitutionality of the statute abrogating the rule
Danielle A. Daigle, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A
Practical Approach to Future Applications of the Statutes Abrogating the
Doctrine, 53 ALA . L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2002).
144 Long v. Kansas City, M. & B.R. Co., 54 So. 62, 64 (Ala. 1910).
145 Carlisle v. Miller, 155 So. 2d 689, 691 (Ala. 1963); See also Vest v.
Gay, 154 So. 2d 297, 300 (Ala. 1963) (holding that the jurisdictional
rule prevented admission of collateral source evidence).
146 ALA . CODE § 6-5-522 (2018).
147 Id.
148 ALA . CODE § 6-5-545 (1993); ALA . CODE § 12-21-45 (1995).
143
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in personal injury cases was challenged and deemed
unconstitutional in 1996.149 The Court noted that the legislature
failed to provide any support or reasoning for why evidence of
collateral source payments should now be admitted.150
Approximately four years later, the Alabama Supreme
Court found itself reevaluating the constitutionality of the
statute which abrogated the rule in personal injury cases.151 In
determining that the statute was constitutional, the court
explained that “[the reasons we previously held the statute to
be unconstitutional] deal with the wisdom of legislative policy
rather than constitutional issues….Matters of policy are for the
legislature and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are
of no concern to the courts.” 152 The Court essentially said that
the courts have no business making decisions that should be
made by the state legislature. The Court reversed its prior
decision that the statute relating to personal injury claims was
unconstitutional because the legislature had not deemed the
statute to be unconstitutional.
The repeal of the collateral source rule in Alabama
continues today, providing for any evidence of collateral source
payments to be admissible in trial. However, the problem lies
in the fact that “[t]he statutes on their faces make evidence of
collateral source payments admissible without providing what
the effect on the law of damages will be.” 153 In other words, the
statute only addresses the rule of evidence concerning the
admission of medical bills and fails to provide any instruction
for the jury on how they are to handle the admission of
collateral source payments in conjunction with the damages
calculation.
As seen in the analysis of Tennessee, Georgia, and
Alabama, each jurisdiction has different rules regarding the
application of the collateral source rule. A state can have a
complete abrogation of the rule like Alabama has done, or a
state could be on the opposite side of the spectrum like Georgia
American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala.
1996).
150 Id. at 1340.
151 Marsh v. Green, 782 So.2d 223 (Ala. 2000).
152 Id. at 231.
153 Daigle, supra note 143.
149
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and can choose to fully adhere to the rule. The fairest
application seems to be Georgia’s method of full adherence,
which allows a plaintiff to receive collateral payments without
the fear of having her damages reduced by the amount of the
collateral payments.

IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis of tort reform across the states of
Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama reveals a wide range of
decisions that have been made regarding the placement and
constitutionality of caps on damages as well as the utilization
of the collateral source rule. An analysis of these decisions
uncovers the severe injustice that these limitations create,
especially in states that lack any evidence or support that the
limitations are actually furthering their stated purpose of
helping lower insurance premiums or improving the state’s
economic development. As seen in both Tennessee and
Georgia, the collateral source rule has been deeply rooted in
both the federal and state justice systems. As is the right to a
trial by jury. Issues such as these, which are embedded within
the very basis of our justice system cannot continue to be
limited and abrogated like they have been in Alabama. The
personal injury attorneys and trial lawyers associations as well
as our legislature, regardless of which political party is
represented, need to form together and continue to lobby
against these limitations on a plaintiff’s recovery.

